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Abstract:  We can learn much about perceptual experience by thinking about how it can mislead us.  In this paper, I 
explore whether, and how, olfactory experience can mislead.  I argue that, in the case of olfactory experience, the 
traditional distinction between illusion and hallucination does not apply.  Integral to the traditional distinction is a 
notion of ‘object-failure’—the failure of an experience to present objects accurately.  I argue that there are no such 
presented objects in olfactory experience.  As a result, olfactory experience can only mislead by means of a kind of 
property hallucination.  The implications of my arguments are twofold.  First, we see that accounts of representational 
content cannot always be based on the visual model.  And, secondly, we see that we must recast the notion of non-
veridicality, allowing for a notion of non-veridical experience that is disengaged from any particular object. 
 
 
We can learn much about perceptual experience by thinking about how it can mislead us.  The idea 
that perceptual experiences have content has been motivated in just this way.  But much of the philosophical 
work on perception has focused on vision, with very little consideration of the chemical senses—taste and 
smell.  In this paper, I explore whether and, if so, how olfactory experience can mislead.  The paper proceeds 
in two stages.  In the first section, I consider whether a representational view is appropriate for olfactory 
experience.  The tendency among content theorists is to suppose that the experiences of all of the modalities 
have representational content.  But, given the phenomenology of human olfactory experience, it is difficult to 
see how a representational view of it might go.1  Moreover, although the idea of an olfactory hallucination is 
one that we seem prima facie comfortable with, the idea of an olfactory illusion is not.  Setting aside this latter 
challenge for the following section, I argue for a view about the nature of olfactory content that honors its 
phenomenology.  In the second section, I consider the notion of non-veridicality for olfactory experience.  On 
the basis of my view of olfactory content, I argue that the traditional distinction between illusory and 
hallucinatory experience does not apply to olfactory experience.  Integral to the traditional notions of illusion 
and hallucination is a notion of ‘object-failure’—the failure of an experience to present objects accurately.  I 
argue that there are no such presented objects in the case of olfactory experience and that the most we get in 
that domain is a kind of property hallucination. 
The implications of my arguments in each section are twofold, but both involve recasting our way of 
thinking about perceptual experience.  First, we see that accounts of representational content cannot always be 
based on the visual model.  And, secondly, we see that we must recast the notion of non-veridicality for 
olfactory experience, allowing for a notion of non-veridical experience that is disengaged from any particular 
object. 
 
1.  A Representational Account of Olfactory Experience 
 
                                                            
*  This  paper  is  dedicated  to  Ned  Hall,  who  always  pushed  me  towards  olfactory  hallucinations—considering  them,  that  is,  
not  having  them.    I  must  also  thank  Dan  Korman  and  Kevin  Sharpe  for  their  helpful  comments  on  previous  presentations  of  
the  paper.  
1  Obviously  there  are  vast  differences  in  acuity  between  the  human  sense  of  smell  and  that  of  other  animals.  The  focus  of  
this  paper  is  human  olfactory  experience  (although  I  will  briefly  discuss  the  olfactory  abilities  of  other  animals  later  in  
section  1).  Unless  otherwise  necessary,  I  will  drop  the  qualifier  ‘human’.  
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Intuitively, the representational content of a perceptual experience is a proposition that specifies the 
way that the world appears to a subject when having that experience..2  If the world is that way, then the 
experience is accurate or veridical.  Otherwise, it is inaccurate or non-veridical.  We can accordingly think of the 
representational content of a perceptual experience as giving the experience’s ‘accuracy conditions’.  Consider 
a philosopher’s favorite: the experience you have when you look at a ripe tomato.  A plausible candidate for 
its accuracy conditions is that a red, roundish, bulgy object is before you.3 
 The idea that we can characterize the representational content of an experience with a set of accuracy 
conditions has serious intuitive appeal.  It is both natural and common to think that, in the case of visual 
experience at least, experience can mislead us about the way the world is.  Navy blue clothing can often look 
black in the store.  It is only once you get your new, apparently black, tie out into the daylight that you realize 
that it is actually navy blue.  What you suffer in this case (and, in particular, when you were in the store) is an 
illusion with respect to the tie's colour.  Your experience misattributes blackness to a navy blue object.  Still, 
you succeed in perceiving the tie; it is there, after all.  But it might not have been.  Like Hamlet’s dagger, you 
might hallucinate a black tie before you. In each case, then, your visual experience commits what I call ‘object-
failure’—the failure to present an apparent object accurately.  In the illusory case, your visual experience 
misattributes a property to an (existent) object.  In the  hallucinatory case, your experience fails trivially—
because there is no such object. 
 The notion of an olfactory illusion is not something that resonates with us.4  We seem to have no 
problem, however, with idea of an olfactory hallucination.  Poll your departmental colleagues about whether 
they think there are olfactory hallucinations and I predict that they will say yes.  This is because there are 
obvious candidates.  A common olfactory disagreement between my husband and I involves whether or not 
we smell gas.  Although I often say I can, my husband always assures me that I am wrong.  There is no gas 
leak and, as a result, no gas to be smelled.  In this case, my husband deems my experience hallucinatory.  And 
cases like this are common, reflected in our tendency to underestimate our sense of smell and ask the 
question: Do you smell that?  Ask your colleagues about olfactory illusions, on the other hand, and, more often 
than not, their affirmation will not be as ready.  And this readiness in the case of hallucination, and 
cautiousness in the case of illusion, is reflected in the scientific literature on olfaction.  Olfactory scientists are 
quite happy to speak in terms of olfactory hallucinations.  But in the case in which an olfactory property is 
misattributed, talk of illusion is rare.  For example, in an introduction to a section on olfactory dysfunction 
(the 'osmias'), Hawkes and Doty (2009) tell us that "[p]hantosmias are olfactory hallucinations"  (p. 111).  
Dysosmia, on the other hand, is marked by "distorted olfactory perception" (Hawkes and Doty 2009, p. 111).  
Elsewhere dysosmia is characterized as "distortion in odor quality" (Cowart and Rawson 2001, p. 589) and 
"disruption in olfactory quality perception" (Cowart and Rawson 2001, p. 589).  On the face of it, dysosmia 
                                                            
2  Notable  among  those  who  think  that  perceptual  experiences  have  representational  content  are:  Davies  (1991;  1992);  Evans  
(1982);  Harman  (1990);  Lycan  (1996);  McGinn  (1996);  Peacocke  (1983);  Searle  (1983)  and  Tye  (1992;  1995;  2000).  
3  It  is  controversial  whether  visual  experience  can  represent  the  property  of  being  a  tomato.    Would  your  experience  be  
inaccurate  if  the  object  before  you  was  actually  an  extremely  realistic  plastic  facsimile?    If  so,  then  the  accuracy  conditions  
must  appeal  to  tomatoes.    If  not,  then  the  accuracy  conditions  can  stay  as  above.    I  take  it  that  it  is  less  controversial  to  hold  
that  the  accuracy  conditions  of  such  an  experience  concern  properties  like  redness,  roundness  and  bulginess  than  
metaphysically  richer  properties  such  as  being  a  tomato.    For  the  sake  of  clarity,  I  take  the  less  controversial  route.  
4  Lycan  (2000)  echoes  this:  “Optical  illusions  are  rife  and  familiar  to  all;  auditory  illusions  are  as  well.    But  it  is  hard  to  think  
of  olfactory  analogues”  (p.  280).  
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seems to be the olfactory analogue of visual illusion, marked by a distortion of the stimulus and not by a lack 
of one.  But scientists seem hesitant to characterize it as such.5   
 The account of olfactory content I will present in this section explains the hesitancy to speak of 
olfactory illusions.  It will also direct our attention to a notion of non-veridicality for olfactory experience onto 
which the traditional distinction between illusion and hallucination cannot map, but preserves what I take to 
be the intuitions behind our comfort with the notion of olfactory hallucination.  I leave this discussion for the 
next section.  At present, although we are yet to have a clear idea of how to characterize its accuracy 
conditions, we can still explore the notion of content for olfactory experience.  We have seen that an 
assignment of content to a visual experience should be compatible with the way things look to a perceiver 
when she enjoys that experience.  Similarly, we could say that an assignment of content to an olfactory 
experience should be compatible with ‘the way that things smell’.  Or we may put this phenomenological 
constraint more neutrally:  the content of olfactory experience must respect what olfactory experience is like.  
As we shall see, something like this latter formulation of the constraint is all that we can reasonably require 
olfactory experience to meet.  The next step, then, is to look at what olfactory experience is like.6 
By way of answering this question, and to provide some helpful contrast, let’s consider visual 
experience further.  Vision is 'object-rich', offering up an array of three-dimensional objects.  This is because 
visual experience has a rich predicative structure.  It presents the world, indeed distinct things in it, as having 
certain qualities.  As I sit beside the window, a fallen autumn leaf lays on the sill outside.  As I look at the leaf, 
it appears that there is an object—namely, the leaf—and that it has certain properties—redness, ovalness and 
so on.  It appears at a certain determinate location before me, and my experience places redness and ovalness 
‘on’, or ‘in’, it.  Visual experience can also present multiple objects.  I look beyond the sill to the dogwood tree 
from which it fell.  I see that there are only a few leaves left on the tree.  In this case my visual experience 
presents individual objects—the leaves—and those objects bear spatial relations to one another (as well as 
other objects).  There is a way that things appear in my visual experience. 
To be sure, there are some visual experiences in which it does not seem that you are presented with 
any particular thing.  The insomniac’s experience of looking at a blank ceiling and the experience of looking at 
a cloudless summer sky are two such experiences.  In each case a perceiver is presented with an 
undifferentiated colored expanse.  In neither experience is the scene as rich in spatial presentation as that of 
the shedding dogwood outside my window.  Still, these circumstances are not typical.  And it is true that the 
typical visual experience presents us with relatively bounded particulars and predicates properties of them.   
 This very point about predication was captured in the main objection to adverbialism.  Jackson (1977) 
was the first to draw attention to the fact that, if adverbialism were true, vision could not solve the Many 
Properties Problem—namely, the problem of distinguishing between scenes in which the same properties are 
instantiated but in different arrangements.  But it clearly can.  So, adverbialism must be false.  Considering the 
Many Properties Problem here can help us by drawing attention to the important differences between visual 
experience and olfactory experience.  Consider the difference between the experience of looking at a green 
                                                            
5  This  is  also  reflected  in  the  index  entries  on  books  on  olfaction.    There  are  entries  for  'ʹolfactory  hallucination'ʹ  (or  simply  
'ʹhallucination'ʹ)  but  never,  in  my  experience,  any  for  'ʹolfactory  illusion'ʹ  (or  'ʹillusion'ʹ).    See,  e.g.,  Brewer,  Castle,  Pantelis  et  al.  
2006;  Wilson  and  Stevenson  2006.  
6  By  ‘olfactory  experience’,  I  mean  (among  other  things)  a  mental  event  that  has  phenomenal  character.    Some  scientists  
think  that  there  are  human  pheromones,  although  it  is  a  hotly  contested  issue.  These  chemical  compounds,  species  specific  
in  the  their  detection,  are  supposed  to  have  effects  on  endocrine  functions  such  as  menstruation  and  sexual  activity.    Their  
detection,  however,  is  supposed  to  occur  unconsciously.    According  to  my  use  of  ‘olfactory  experience’,  then,  an  event  
consisting  of  the  detection  of  these  chemical  compounds  does  not  count  as  an  olfactory  experience.    For  more  on  
pheromones,  see,  e.g.,  McClintock  (1983;  1999)  and  McClintock  et  al.  (2001). 
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circle to the left of a red triangle and that of looking at red circle to the left of a green triangle.  If visual 
experience simply reported which properties are instantiated (e.g. that greenness is instantiated, circularity is 
instantiated, etc.), it would not be able to distinguish between these two experiences.  But it clearly can; and it 
does so by predicating these properties of objects and by presenting them at locations.  Each experience 
attributes circularity and redness (or greenness), and triangularity and greenness (or redness) to different 
objects and these objects are presented at different locations in one’s visual field.7 
 Now consider olfactory experience.  Is there ever a way that things appear in olfactory experience?  
Unlike visual experience, olfactory experience doesn’t seem to present ordinary objects.  If I walk into the 
kitchen and take in a novel sweet smell, it is only after you have told me that you have been grinding saffron 
that I am able to say ‘I smell the saffron’.  What’s more, when I stand and talk to you as you grind the spice, 
the saffron smell doesn’t appear be at any determinate location before me.  Rather than smelling that the 
saffron smell is instantiated at certain locations before my nose and not at others, I simply smell that the saffron 
smell is instantiated.  To be sure, I may go on to determine that it is instantiated in certain parts of the kitchen 
and not in others.  But, if I do, I have to rely on moving about, on exploring my environment.  Bracket the 
information I gain from this kind of exploration and any locatedness—other than the simply ‘here’—goes as 
well.8  And this, it would seem, applies to any typical olfactory experience.  This is not to say that humans are 
never capable of localizing odour sources.  We can, but only in a highly controlled laboratory environment and 
equipped with the appropriate apparatus (Porter et al, 2005; von Békésy 1994). My aim in this paper is to 
provide an account of the olfactory experiences we all have day-to-day.   Most of us will never find ourselves 
in the laboratory environment.  But, day-to-day, we are presented with olfactory properties presented at no 
other location than simply ‘here’.9  For this reason, I will not consider in detail the kinds of experiences we 
have in the laboratory.  I will, however, return to them briefly at the end of this section. 
 Because olfactory experience does not present smells at distinct locations, it cannot solve the Many 
Properties Problem.  Consider a case in which you try to mask the lingering smell of cooked fish by spraying 
some lemon-scented air freshener in the kitchen.  As is often the case with stubborn lingering smells, even 
though you have covered the entire room with freshener, the fishy smell isn’t gone.  To be sure, it now smells 
lemony; but it also still smells fishy.  Call this case Full Cover.  Now consider a case in which you fail to cover 
the whole room with the spray; you miss a spot by the sink, say.  Call this case Miss-a-Spot.  Standing in the 
kitchen and taking a sniff, you wouldn’t be able to tell whether you were in Full Cover or Miss-a-Spot.  In each 
case it now smells lemony.  And it also still smells fishy.  But your experience does not report that the smells 
are arranged in any particular way.10   So, if, after a brief exit from the room, you went from being in Miss-a-
Spot to being in Full Cover you would not notice the difference.  Unlike our visual example, your olfactory 
experience would not account for the difference with a change in predication—or, to put it in a weaker way, 
                                                            
7  By  ‘visual  field’  I  mean  the  scene  before  the  perceiver’s  eyes.    I  do  not  use  ‘visual  field’  to  denote  a  mental  particular,  or  
sense  datum.  
8  In  this  characterization  of  the  relevant  location,  I  follow  Matthen  (2005).    I  will  return  to  Matthen  later  in  this  section.  
9  Another  way  to  say  this  is  to  say  that  I  am  interested  in  the  ‘static’  olfactory  experience—the  experience  one  has  when  one  
is  not  moving  about,  exploring  one’s  environment.    We  might  also  call  this  the  ‘minimal’  olfactory  experience.    But,  I  
recognize  that  a  lot  of  our  perceptual  experience  is  not  minimal.    It  occurs  when  we  are  up  and  about,  engaging  with  the  
world.    Obviously,  a  thorough  analysis  of  the  nature  of  olfactory  experience  would  have  to  consider  the  investigative  nature  
of  olfactory  perception—e.g.  our  active  engagement  in  figuring  out  where  the  saffron  smell  is  instantiated  and  where  it  is  
not.    Still,  if  we  can  motivate  the  view  that  the  even  minimal  olfactory  experience  is  representational,  so  much  the  better  for  
the  prospects  of  a  representational  account  of  olfactory  experience.  
10  To  be  sure,  there  might  be  a  difference  in  the  perceived  intensity  of  the  lemony  smell  in  each  case.    But  that  would  not  
amount  to  a  difference  in  the  experienced  location  of  that  smell.  
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with a change in where it places the features in question.  In both Full Cover and Miss-a-Spot, your experience 
reports ‘fishy smell and lemony smell here’, but nothing more.   
Because of the considerations raised by the visual version of the Many Properties Problem, it is 
widely held that object perception presupposes spatial perception.  And as a consideration of Full Cover and 
Miss-a-Spot has shown us, if olfactory experience only reports ‘these properties instantiated here’, we must 
conclude that olfactory experience gives us either diminished objection perception or no object perception at 
all. 11  This conclusion appears to be behind the following remark from Chalmers (1996): “[s]mell has little in 
the way of apparent structure and often floats free of any apparent object, remaining a primitive presence in 
our sensory manifold” (p. 8).   
 Olfactory experience, then, seems disengaged from any particular object.  As a result, we might be 
tempted to conclude that olfactory experience simply isn’t in the business of representing—that it is, instead, 
purely sensational or a kind of raw feel.  In the very little that has been written about smell in the 
philosophical literature, this kind of view is presented as the natural view about olfactory experience.  In the 
opening chapter of Sense and Content (1983), Christopher Peacocke suggests that “a sensation of …[smell] may 
have no representational content of any sort, though of course the sensation will be of a distinctive kind”  
(p. 5).  Although William Lycan holds that olfactory experiences are representational, he, like Peacocke, 
suggests that, considered in and of themselves, they give us little reason to think so.  Lycan tells us that 
“[p]henomenologically speaking, a smell is just a modification of our consciousness, a qualitative condition or 
event in us” (1996, p. 281).   
 Although the view that olfactory experience is non-representational might seem initially tempting, it 
is not inevitable.  In fact we ought to avoid such a view since additional, non-phenomenological, 
considerations render it implausible.  There is no doubt that we think of the senses as informational systems.  
Although the phenomenology of olfactory experience is not as object-rich as visual experience, we still employ 
our olfactory capabilities in gathering information about the world.  If I open the fridge and smell rotting 
vegetables, I refrain from putting those vegetables in my mouth.  If I am particularly courageous, I root 
around in the fridge and find the source of the bad smell, so that I can throw it away and ensure that it doesn’t 
infect other food that I may eat.  Similarly, if, in the grips of hunger, I smell something cooking, I make my 
way towards that food so that I can fulfill my need to eat.  Although olfactory experience may not present us 
with particular objects, it clearly informs the decisions we make and the actions we take.  Our olfactory 
experience has this in common with our visual experience as well as the experiences of other modalities.  As 
guides of behavior and grounds of belief, the experiences of all of the sense modalities form a common kind.  
A shared representational nature provides a way of accounting for this commonality.   
This is made even clearer if we consider our olfactory experiences along with those of other animals.  
We happily admit that animals with ‘better’ senses of smells than ours enjoy experiences that are 
                                                            
11  In  a  footnote,  Clark  (2000)  suggests  that  olfactory  experience  cannot  solve  the  Many  Properties  Problem.    He  says:    
[p]erhaps  human  olfaction  fails  this  test;  it  may  lack  sufficient  spatial  character.    Can  one  smell  two  distinct  
simultaneous  instances  of  the  same  acrid  odour?    Can  one  distinguish  a  presentation  in  which  something  smells  both  
acrid  and  musty  from  one  in  which  something  else  smells  musty?”  (p.  79).  
Smith  (2002)  also  appears  to  raise  the  same  point.    He  states:  
[I]t  may  seem  to  you  that  you  can,  standing  in  a  well-­‐‑stocked  florist’s,  smell  the  odours  of  the  flowers  filling  the  room.    
On  reflection,  however,  we  realize  that  this  is  not  really  so.    A  single,  strongly  perfumed  and  variegated  bunch  of  
flowers  under  your  nose  could  lead  to  the  same  perception.    Blindfolded,  you  would  not  be  able  to  tell  the  difference.  
(138)  
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representational.12  After all, their olfactory experiences are for them as our visual experiences are for us.  They 
use their noses where we typically rely on our eyes.  We have no problem in admitting that the world appears 
to us in certain ways in visual experience and, as a result, no problem in granting the same to other animals’ 
olfactory experiences.  Moreover, although the olfactory capacities of many animals outshine our own, there is 
no doubt that our olfactory experiences function like theirs to guide behavior and action.  Given this, it would 
be strange to conclude that their olfactory experiences are representational and ours are not.  The more 
plausible view is one according to which our olfactory experiences differ from theirs in degree of richness and 
not in kind.  
The plausible view, then, is one according to which olfactory experience has representational 
content.  But the considerations that we have relied on in coming to this conclusion do not focus specifically 
on the phenomenology of human olfactory experience.  Does this mean that we should abandon the 
phenomenological constraint on content?  No, we should not.  Other considerations have led us 
independently to the conclusion that olfactory experience has content.  But, we are still left with the question 
of what content it has.  And in this is where the phenomenological constraint does its work.  In section 1, I 
drew attention to a neutral formulation of the constraint: the content of olfactory experience must respect 
what olfactory experience is like.  There is no doubt that there is something that it is like to have an olfactory 
experience.  And, although there is no way that particular things smell in olfactory experience, there is a way 
that the world appears in it—even if it appears in a much less ‘specific’ way than it does in visual experience.  
Although olfactory experience does not ‘pin’ properties onto any particular thing, it certainly seems as though 
we are coming into contact with something external to us.  After all, integral to smelling is breathing.  When 
we smell, we literally take in portions of the world; without doing so, we couldn’t hope to smell anything.  To 
be sure, we typically are not aware of our breathing, and so it might seem phenomenologically incorrect to 
say that we experience it as a way of literally taking in portions of the world.  Even when we pay close 
attention to our breathing, it is questionable whether we experience it this way.  But, one exception to this is 
when we smell something and, in cases of an unpleasant smell, when we hold our breaths to avoid smelling it.  
In these smelly circumstances, it does seem as if we are drawing something into ourselves that is distinct from 
us, or avoiding doing so.  By contrasting the phenomenology of breathing in the case where we smell 
something and the case where we do not, we see that olfactory experience involves our being directed 
towards the world in a significant way—even if we are not directed towards any particular object in it.13  
Although not as rich as the visual case, there is something for the phenomenological constraint to work with 
in the olfactory case. 
 At this point we might be tempted to eschew objects in an assignment of content to olfactory 
experience and embrace a view according to which it is simply the world that appears to have certain 
properties.  But it would be wrong, or at least imprecise, to do so.  Typically, when philosophers ask how the 
world appears to be in a certain experience, what they are after is a characterization of how the things in the 
world appear to be in that experience.  When, in the grips of a poetic insomniac moment, I stare up at a blank 
                                                            
12  Consider  the  hammerhead  shark  as  an  example  of  just  such  a  case.    The  shark’s  sense  of  smell  is  remarkable  in  that  it  is  
directional.    Like  the  human  sense  of  hearing,  sharks  can  typically  determine  the  direction  that  an  odourant  is  coming  from.  
(See,  e.g.,  Hodgson  and  Mathewson  1971).    The  hammerhead  shark  as  an  extreme  example  of  the  physiology  that  makes  
this  possible.    The  distance  between  the  nasal  cavities  is  large  in  most  sharks  but  it  is  at  its  largest  with  the  great  
hammerhead.    An  odourant  coming  from  the  extreme  left  of  the  shark’s  head  will  arrive  at  the  left  nasal  cavity  before  it  
does  the  right.    To  be  sure,  this  is  an  extreme  case.    But  researchers  have  shown  that,  in  many  other  cases,  the  hammerhead  
is  able  to  sample  more  of  the  medium  than  other  sharks  and,  as  a  result,  is  able  to  resolve  differences  in  odourant  
concentration  between  each  nostril.    This  also  allows  the  shark  to  locate  the  direction  of  the  odour  source.  
13  I  must  thank  Susanna  Siegel  for  drawing  my  attention  to  this  point.  
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ceiling and describe the way the world appears to be, I take myself to be describing the way that something in 
the world appears to be.  In this visual case, where it seems as if no particular thing is visually presented, we 
do not conclude that one’s visual experience fails to attribute properties to objects.  It does, just not in a way 
that allows us to pick out the particular object presented.  Why suppose that it is any different in the olfactory 
case?  Although olfactory experience is not as object-rich as the typical visual experience, we need not, and 
ought not, conclude that it fails to attribute properties to objects.  As a consideration of Full Cover and Miss-a-
Spot has shown us, olfactory experience gives no information about the layout of objects around us.  But, as 
the ceiling example shows, it is a further claim that olfactory experience gives us no information about objects.  
And that further claim is implausible.  The idea that natural selection would preserve a sensory ‘system’ that 
provided the organism with no information about the objects in its environment seems, at best, extremely 
implausible.   
The task before us, then, is to provide an account of olfactory content that respects its 
phenomenology but also allows that it predicates properties of objects.  Obviously an object-involving account 
of its content is not an option.  We have seen that olfactory experience gives us the ability to distinguish the 
properties presented to us, but that it does not allow us to refer to the particular objects that instantiate them.  
As a result, there is no way that things smell.  Those in favour of an object-involving account of visual 
experience argue that an abstract account of content ignores a crucial phenomenological fact, namely the 
particularity of visual experience.14  It can’t be, the argument goes, that my visual experience of the leaf on the 
sill represents that something or other is red, oval and so on.  Rather, it represents that a particular thing (that 
very thing there!) is so.  But, despite its lack of fit in the visual case, this kind of abstract view is a remarkably 
good fit for olfactory experience.  Our consideration of the Many Properties Problem has shown us that 
olfactory experience does not present us with multiple objects.  Indeed, consideration of this problem has 
shown that olfactory experience predicates properties to just one object—and not in any way that enables us 
to pick that object out.  That is to say, olfactory experience predicates properties to a ‘something we know not 
what’.  As a result, the view that olfactory experience tells us nothing more than that something or other is fishy 
and lemony fits nicely with the phenomenological facts.  Armed with a notion of abstract (i.e. existentially 
quantified) content, we can say, more generally, that a given olfactory experience represents that there is 
something or other here with certain properties.15  In other words, if abstract content in general has the form  
∃x(x is F & at L), then olfactory experience in particular has the form ∃x(x is F & here).  While a characterization 
of the content of olfactory experience might be rich in terms of predicates (as rich as the situation we are in 
and our discriminatory abilities allow), it will only ever need one quantifier and reference to the 
undifferentiated location of ‘here’.16  On the abstract view, then, the experience you have in Full Cover and the 
experience you have in Miss-a-Spot do not differ with respect to their representational content.  Each has the 
content ∃x(x is fishy, lemony & here).  And this is just the result we want.   
It is worth pausing for a moment over my characterization of the relevant location L.  In 
characterizing the location as ‘here’, I build on a remark of Matthen’s (2005) in which he claims: “[smells] 
have, at best, a primitive—that is, an undifferentiating—feature-location structure—every smell of which I am 
aware is simply here” (p. 284).  In previous statements of my view, I have followed Chalmers (2006) who 
                                                            
14  Those  in  favour  of  an  object-­‐‑involving  account  of  visual  experience  include  Burge  (1991);  Campbell  (2002)  and  Martin  
(2003).    Those  who  have  argued  for  an  abstract,  or  existentially  quantified,  account  are  Davies  (1991;  1992;  1996);  McGinn  
(1996)  and  Tye  (1995,  2000). 
15 In  another  paper  (forthcoming),  I  argue  that  these  objects  are  in  fact  odours—collections  of  molecules  in  the  air.  
16  In  this  way,  it  differs  from  visual  experience  where,  if  we  assume  that  its  content  is  abstract,  we  would  require  multiple  
quantifiers  and  reference  to  more  determinate  locations.  
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claims: “Intuitively, an olfactory experience represents that a certain smell is present in one’s environment, 
perhaps in a certain broad location” (p. 112).  In particular, I have argued that olfactory content has the form 
∃x(x is F and around me) or the form ∃x(x is F and out there).  But this is not good enough.  Although each 
captures the lack of spatial differentiation characteristic of olfactory experience, they fail insofar as they give 
unintuitive predictions about veridicality in certain hypothetical cases.  Consider the following, inspired by 
Paul Grice (1961):17 
You’re in a room with two burning sticks of incense.  The first gives off a citrusy smell; the 
second gives off a tropical one.  The smells are actually very similar, but different enough 
that you can easily tell them apart.  Now the tropical one is in a tightly sealed box; no smoke 
is getting out.  So, it’s only the smoke from the citrusy incense that actually reaches your 
nose and triggers your olfactory receptors.  However, due to some kind of olfactory 
malfunction, you end up having a tropical olfactory experience and not a citrusy one.  Is 
your tropical experience veridical? 
The intuitive answer is ‘no’; your experience is not veridical.  What you are breathing in is in fact a citrusy 
odour (-cloud), not a tropical one.18  So, it can’t be that your experience is veridical.  But, if your olfactory 
experience had the content ‘something or other around me is tropical’ or the content ‘something or other out 
there is tropical’, then we would be forced to conclude that your experience is veridical.  After all, there is 
something tropical around you or out there—namely, the odour in the box!  But, if your experience reports 
that there is something or other here that is tropical, then we get the intuitive result.  Your experience is not 
veridical.  What is here is the citrusy odour.  It is the citrusy odour that you are taking in, after all.  The tropical 
odour is not here; it is there.  Characterizing the relevant location as ‘here’, we preserve the lack of spatial 
differentiation characteristic of olfactory experience while, at the same time, preserving our strong intuitions 
about the incense case. 
 Now, we must remember that it is contingent that the typical olfactory experience has content of this 
form.  If more of our olfactory experiences were like those we can enjoy in the lab, then a characterization of 
their contents would require multiple quantifiers and appeal to more determinate locations than simply 
‘here’.  Indeed, if more of our olfactory experiences were like those had in the lab, then the typical olfactory 
experience might be one for which an object-involving account of its content is more appropriate.19  As it 
stands, however, this is not the typical olfactory experience, and the right view about olfactory content is one 
according to which it has a very weak kind of abstract, or existentially quantified, content. 
 
2.  Non-Veridicality and Olfactory Experience 
 
Earlier, I drew attention to the fact that the notion of an olfactory illusion doesn’t seem to resonate 
with us, but that the notion of olfactory hallucination does in some sense.  My view about olfactory content 
can explain why this is.   
As we have seen, it makes sense to speak of accuracy conditions in the case of visual experience.20  In 
the case of the typical visual experience, we can ask two separate questions of the object of experience, o: 
                                                            
17  I  am  indebted  to  Dan  Korman  for  pointing  this  case  out  to  me. 
18  I  add  the  expression  in  parentheses  to  stress  that  ‘odour’  refers  to  a  particular.    Again,  I  take  it  that  the  actual  olfactory  
objects  are  collections  of  molecules  in  the  air.    See  also  fn.  15.    Having  stressed  this  again,  I  will  leave  the  parenthetical  
remark  in  what  follows.  
19  If  more  of  our  olfactory  experience  were  like  those  of  the  lab,  we  would  be  considerably  more  like  the  hammerhead  shark.  
See  fn.12.  
20  It  is  not  simply  the  visual  domain  for  which  it  makes  sense.    For  examples  of  illusions  in  the  auditory  domain,  see  Deutsch  
(1974;  1981)  and  Deutsch  and  Roll  (1976).    For  examples  of  those  in  the  tactile  domain,  see  Mochiyama  et  al.  (2005).  
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For any property F that o appears to have, does o really have F?  (V-Attribution) 
Is o there at all?  (V-Existence) 
Consider, once again the experience I have when I look at the leaf on my window sill.  In this case, there is a 
particular thing of which we can ask, as in V-Attribution, “yes, it appears to be red, but is it really as it 
appears?”  And, similarly, there is a particular thing of which we can ask, as in V-Existence, “yes, it appears to 
be there, but is it?”  As we know, if the answer to either is ‘no’, then visual experience fails to present an 
apparent object accurately; it commits object-failure.  But they commit it in different ways.  If the answer to V-
Attribution is ‘no’ (because the leaf is yellow, say), my experience misattributes a property to an (existent) 
object.  And if the answer to V-Existence is ‘no’ my experience reports that an object is present when it is not.  
This difference in the kind of object-failure committed—the difference between visual illusion and visual 
hallucination—is marked by the different content of V-Attribution and V-Existence, in what we ask of a given 
object of experience—in this case, the particular leaf before me. 
If there were olfactory analogues of V-Attribution and V-Existence, we could ask of an object of 
olfactory experience, x: 
For any olfactory property F that x appears to have, does x really have F? (O-Attribution) 
Is x there at all?  (O-Existence) 
But, as I argued above, unlike visual experience, olfactory experience seems disengaged from any particular 
object.  It grants us minimal object discrimination.  Olfactory experience never presents us with an individual 
object, at least not in the way that vision might present a particular leaf.  That is to say, there are no ‘objects of 
olfaction’ in the way that there are objects of vision.  For this reason, there is no particular thing of which we 
can ask, as in V-Attribution, “yes, it appears to be fishy, but is it really as it appears?”  In that sense, there are no 
olfactory illusions.  This explains why the idea that a smell is misattributed to something has no obvious 
purchase and, in turn, why the notion of olfactory illusion does not sit well with us.  But, for similar reasons, 
there are no olfactory hallucinations.  That is, there is no particular thing of which we can ask, as in V-
Existence, “yes, it appears to be there, but is it?” 
 But now we are faced with a puzzle.  In section 1, I drew attention to the fact that there is a sense in 
which the notion of an olfactory hallucination resonates with us.  But, we have just concluded that it must not.   
The abstract view of olfactory content can explain why we are not comfortable with the notion of an olfactory 
illusion.  And it can also solve this puzzle.  The explanation of our unease with the idea of an olfactory illusion 
lay in a consideration of the kinds of questions that we are unable to ask in evaluating a given olfactory 
experience.  The explanation of our comfort with the idea of olfactory hallucination lies in considering the 
kinds of questions we can ask in evaluating an olfactory experience given the kind of content it has.  This, in 
turn, directs our attention to the way in which olfactory experience is able to mislead, and the answer to our 
puzzle. 
Consider Paul.  Paul is someone who, when presented with a lavender odour, has the experience of 
the smell of rotting meat.  Now consider Mary.  Mary is prone to having an experience of rotting meat when 
there is no odour at all in her vicinity.21  For the sake of brevity, let’s call this property ‘putrid’.  To go back to 
the earlier discussion of olfactory dysfunction in section 1, Paul suffers from dysosmia and Mary suffers from 
                                                            
21  This  is  not  anything  that  I  have  read  reported  as  such.    But  it  is  surely  a  possible  olfactory  experience  and,  therefore,  one  
that  we  can  consider.  
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phantosmia.22  Remember that it is Paul’s circumstance that olfactory scientists hesitate to deem illusory.  
Mary’s situation, on the other hand, is widely referred to as an olfactory hallucination.  Now, remember 
further that olfactory experience only ever reports that there is something or other here that has a certain 
property (or set of properties).  According to the abstract view of olfactory content, then, the content of both 
Paul and Mary’s respective experiences is as follows: there is something or other here that is putrid.  Or, to 
put it more formally, the content of each is: ∃x(x is putrid & here).  Given this content, in evaluating Paul’s 
experience, we can ask: 
Is there anything putrid at Paul (i.e., ‘here’ for Paul)? 
And in Mary's case, we can ask:   
Is there anything putrid at Mary (i.e., ‘here’ for Mary)? 
That is, given the content of their respective experiences, all we can ask in each case is whether there is 
something or other ‘at them’ that is putrid.  And we can ask no more.  The question in the purported illusory 
case—Paul’s case—is the very same question as the question in the hallucinatory case.  And in terms of its 
form, that question looks a lot more like O-Existence than it does O-Attribution.  Even in Paul’s case, the 
content of olfactory experience constrains us in such a way that, in evaluating his experience, we don’t ask 
whether putrid has been misattributed to an object singled out by the experience, but rather whether there is 
an object in existence (at him) that is putrid.  It is no wonder, then, that we feel more comfortable with the idea 
of an olfactory hallucination.  The only kind of question we can ask in evaluating any olfactory experience is 
similar in form to the one we ask when querying whether a visual experience is hallucinatory.23 
 What this shows is that the traditional distinction between illusion and hallucination does not apply 
to olfactory experience.  But that is not to say there couldn’t be non-veridical olfactory experiences.  There 
could: if there is nothing at the perceiver that is putrid, then the content of her experience is false, and the 
experience is non-veridical.  But given the nature of olfactory content, this notion of non-veridicality admits of 
no further divisions—although it does admit of further characterization. 
 I said earlier that illusions and hallucinations commit object-failure—the failure to present particular 
objects accurately.  Is it appropriate to think of non-veridical olfactory experience as committing the same?  
After all, given its content, we are forced to ask whether there is an object there that has a certain property.  
And, again, this sounds like O-Existence.  It might seem at first, then, that non-veridical olfactory experiences, 
like visual hallucinations, object-fail trivially because there is no object there.  If Paul’s experience is non-
veridical, it is because there is nothing there that is putrid.  Why not say that all non-veridical olfactory 
experiences are directly analogous to visual hallucinations?  This would preserve our intuitions about the 
possibility of olfactory hallucinations, after all.  But it would do so at an expense.  To characterize non-
veridical olfactory experiences as directly analogous to visual hallucinations would muddy an interesting 
distinction between visual illusion and hallucination, one defined in terms of the presentation of particular 
objects.  And, presumably, we want to preserve a distinction that has been so useful in helping to characterize 
and evaluate the contents of visual experience. 
 Still, there is another notion of hallucination in the vicinity, one free of ties to any object.  In the 
visual case, there is something particular ‘in mind’ when we ask after the veridicality of an experience.  And, 
                                                            
22  In  fact,  Paul’s  situation  is  an  instance  of  a  certain  form  of  dysosmia  known  as  cacosmia—an  olfactory  disorder  in  which  a  
pleasant  odour  is  perceived  as  foul  or  putrefactive.  
23  I  say  “similar”  because  the  questions  obviously  differ  with  respect  to  whether  they  single  out  a  particular  object  and  ask  
after  its  existence.    As  we  have  seen,  in  the  visual  case,  an  object  is  singled  out.    In  the  olfactory  case,  it  is  not.  
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as we know, there is no particular thing ‘in mind’ when we ask after an olfactory experience.  Let’s restrict 
object-failure to the former case, where it makes the most sense.  Rather than squeezing olfactory experience 
into the visual mold, I suggest that we conceive of non-veridical olfactory experience as a kind of ‘property 
hallucination’.  In leading up to my statement of the abstract view of olfactory content, I characterized 
olfactory experience as reporting that a given property is instantiated (in particular, that saffron is instantiated).  
And, as the cases of Paul and Mary have shown us, olfactory experience is best described as non-veridical 
when putrid (in their cases) is not instantiated—i.e. when there is no putridness at them.  Olfactory 
experience, then, is non-veridical when a perceiver hallucinates that a given property is instantiated.  In Paul’s 
(or Mary’s) case, his (or her) olfactory experience is a property hallucination.  Given this, non-veridical 
olfactory experience is best described as committing, not object-failure, but ‘property-failure’.   
Now, this might rub the wrong way.  But it should not.  Up until this point, hallucination has been 
defined in terms of objects.  It is what we are used to because we are used to the visual model of thinking 
about perception.  But this doesn’t mean it has to, or indeed should, stay this way.  As the case of olfactory 
experience has shown us, some misleading experiences are better captured by a notion of hallucination 
defined in terms of properties. 
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